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Abstract
We present an effective Sybil attack [12] against social
location based services. Our attack is based on creating
a large number of reputed “bot drivers”, and controlling
their reported locations using fake GPS reports. We show
how this attack can be used to influence social navigation
systems by applying it to WAZE [8] - a prominent social
navigation application used by over 50 million drivers.
We show that our attack can fake traffic jams and dra-
matically influence routing decisions. We present sev-
eral techniques for preventing the attack, and show that
effective mitigation likely requires the use of additional
carrier information.
1 Introduction
Social navigation is rapidly becoming a prevalent ap-
proach for navigation. A social navigation system col-
lects navigation data such as route duration, traffic con-
gestion, road obstacles, and even map layout from users,
and then uses this information to route other users.
WAZE is a prominent social navigation system used by
over 50 million users worldwide (recently acquired by
Google). At this scale, social navigation data is consid-
ered a reliable source of traffic information trusted by
many. For example, WAZE traffic information is used to
feed reports for various Radio and TV stations [9], as
well as the widely used Google Maps navigation appli-
cation [3]. This propagates the influence of social navi-
gation to a much wider community.
In this paper, we present the first Sybil attack on social
navigation systems, and demonstrate its effectiveness by
applying it to WAZE. In a Sybil attack the attacker sub-
verts the reputation system of a network by creating a
large number of pseudonymous identities, using them to
gain a disproportionately large influence [12]. Our main
idea is to create a large number of reputed “bot drivers”
and use fake GPS information to drive them in desired
traffic patterns. For example, the “bots” can be used to
simulate patterns detected by WAZE as “heavy traffic”.
In contrast to previous attacks on WAZE [1], our ap-
proach does not require reverse engineering the client, or
the protocol, and cannot be mitigated by hardening the
protocol as it uses legitimate clients.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack by ap-
plying it to WAZE, and showing that our technique can
simulate traffic jams, and dramatically influence the rout-
ing decisions presented to users.
The attack has vast security and financial implications.
For example, the attack could be targeted towards spe-
cific businesses or toll roads, falsely reporting the area as
congested and discouraging drivers from nearing it. The
attack also affects drivers safety, where drivers may be
sent along a less suited road, or distracted by spurious
obstacle reports. We also discuss privacy issues due to
disclosure of user information on the WAZE “live map”.
Main Contributions The main contributions of this
paper are:
• We present a Sybil attack on social navigation sys-
tems.
• Our attack is cheap and can be facilitated using free
off-the-shelf emulation software, a simple fake GPS
player application, controlled by the Android De-
bug Bridge, running on a 16 core machine.
• We demonstrate our approach by simulating traffic
jams, and affecting the routing presented to drivers
on the WAZE social navigation system.
• We present two approaches for mitigating our at-
tack and similar attacks on social navigation: us-
ing carrier information and user behavioral analysis.
We evaluate them based on parameters of simplic-
ity, user experience, effectiveness and cost.
2 Attacks
In this section we describe all successfully implemented
attacks. We first describe how to create bot drivers
and increase their reputation, and then describe how bot
drivers are used for various attacks.
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2.1 Creating Bot Drivers
Becoming an influential part of the WAZE community
requires a single click. Just by installing and starting the
application on her device, a user is able to view surround-
ing user and traffic information, influence nearby users
by reporting various road obstacles, and affect routing
and traffic information. This allowed us for automated
creation of bot drivers simply by starting an emulator,
running WAZE, and running a script that clicks the “start
driving” button.
Registration does not require validation WAZE offers
a registration process, encouraged by a rating system
where users receive points for using the application and
reporting obstacles. The registration process however,
employs no validation mechanisms. We assume WAZE
intentionally avoids user validation, in hopes of encour-
aging new users to try the application. Interestingly,
deleting a WAZE account does require the user to pass a
CAPTCHA. This further establishes our assumption that
the WAZE registration process was designed to gather and
maintain users, and not to validate them.
Training Reputed Bots Due to lack of validation, we
were able to automate the process of creating a regis-
tered WAZE user. We used random bot usernames to
avoid clashes with pre-existing names. Registration does
require a well-formed email address, but it is not further
verified. Throughout our experiments, we re-used the
same user accounts and were able to gain rating, by sim-
ulating driving and reporting obstacles. The ability to
automatically register and gain rating, makes it harder
to mitigate attacks by relying on user rating and tenure.
In fact, by emulating benign user behavior, attempts to
eliminate bots on behavioral basis are likely to fail.
2.2 Creating Traffic Jams and Influencing Routing
Next, we describe how we were able to simulate traffic
jams and influence the WAZE routing algorithm. WAZE
deduces traffic congestion and routing time informa-
tion from location and movement data reported by its
users [4]. This algorithm resides on the server side of
the WAZE system and was never publicly disclosed. The
main challenge of this work, was in fact experimentally
deducing and exploiting this algorithm.
Our experiments consisted of explorative adjustment
of the following parameters: (i) Data set size (number of
bots), (ii) Drive duration, (iii) Speed and movement pat-
tern. All parameters were aimed at matching the WAZE
traffic jam scenario. We show that with a small amount
of resources, we were able to simulate a traffic jam.
Gaining reputation The WAZE application states: “As
you advance to higher levels your reports get greater in-
fluence”. We therefore trained our bot drivers by driving
on campus in average speeds for several hours.
Simulating standstill traffic Our initial attempts at simu-
lating congestion consisted of spawning botnets (groups
of “bot drivers”) of increasing sizes (5, 10, 15 etc.) and
statically placing them at the target location. We as-
sumed WAZE would acknowledge these static drivers as
stuck in traffic, and report a traffic jam. This approach
did not work, even after scattering the bots along the tar-
get road in different patterns, attempting to mimic a more
realistic standstill traffic scenario. We attribute this result
to WAZE interpreting the scenario as users entering their
vehicle and starting WAZE, but have yet to move - a com-
mon scenario among navigation users.
Simulating slowdowns Our next round of experiments
consisted of simulating a gradual slowdown in traffic. As
before, we sent increasingly larger groups of bots to the
target location, but this time they moved through the area
in gradually slower speeds of 15, 8 and 2 kph. At first,
each bot passed through the area once for each speed in
the set, then twice, etc., up to the point where each bot
spends 20 minutes passing the route (again and again)
at a certain speed before moving on to the next slower
speed. Lastly, we incorporated short periods of standing
still (10 seconds) into each pass, also in increasing dura-
tions. This scenario still failed to yield congestion, as it
required one final addition, described next.
Figure 1: Speed pattern of bots participating in the attack
Speed is relative. We conducted our experiments on the
closed campus area (see Sec. 3.4). Initially, we saw
that even when consistently simulating gradually slow-
ing traffic, with large botnets of reputed drivers, no con-
gestion was reported. One way this result could be ex-
plained is that WAZE takes other, non user-related param-
eters into effect. These parameters could include: time
of day, date, weather conditions and road information.
We in fact learned, that since the campus area is a very
low speed zone, WAZE regarded all slow driving traffic
through it as normal rather than congested. In fact, it
seems that the WAZE congestion reporting algorithm is a
relative one, i.e., a route is congested if its current aver-
age speed is considerably lower relative to former known
speeds. Thus, we added another phase to the bots driv-
ing pattern, where driving was initiated at 70kph. After a
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period of 20 minutes, we reverted to the previous pattern
of simulating slowdown in traffic, finally leading to suc-
cessful simulation of a traffic jam. Fig. 1 shows the speed
over time of each bot in the successful implementation
of the attack. The successful attack consisted of only 15
bots, driving at the pattern shown in Fig. 1, where we
reset a bot location to the route origin whenever it has
reached the end of the route (and thus enable it to drive
the route again according to the desired speed pattern).
Simulated traffic jams on the WAZE map. Fig. 2 shows
a traffic jam created by our attack. The congestion is
marked by a bold red line, annotated with arrows show-
ing the congested direction, along with a notification
marking the average speed as 8kph. The congested
route also features the botnet used for the attack, show-
ing as group of WAZE users along the start of congested
route (we further discuss users shown on the live map
in Sec. 2.4). We observed that traffic jams created by
the attack persists for roughly 20 minutes past the point
where the bots stop driving.
Figure 2: Reported traffic jam, created by the attack1
Influencing routing We were able to influence the WAZE
routing algorithm and potentially send benign users on
different routes. This has vast security and financial im-
plications. The attack can be used to ease actual conges-
tion in roads of interest to the attacker, by falsely report-
ing them as congested, and sending away benign users.
Alternately, an attacker may congest areas causing po-
tential financial damage, due to time and fuel wasted by
drivers taking longer routes, or drivers avoiding using
tool roads or visiting businesses residing in congested
areas. This also a safety issue, where drivers may be
sent on a less suited road. Furthermore, using the attack,
one is able to completely determine the route planned by
WAZE for a user trying to get to a destination. Conse-
quently, users will be directed along a desired path con-
trolled by a malicious attacker. Fig. 3a shows the rec-
ommended route, prior to an attack. The route is marked
1WAZE map images included Hebrew and thus were edited for
readability. Link to original images: http://www.cs.technion.
ac.il/~nimi/waze.html
by a bold purple line, annotated with street names, and
reported to be 1.5km long with 3 minutes traversal time.
Fig. 3b shows the change in route due to the fake traffic
jam we created along the previous route. The new route
is 1.6km long and takes 4 minutes to traverse.
(a) Pre-attack route (b) Post-attack route
Figure 3: WAZE routing, influenced by the attack
Thwarting machine-like behaviour Throughout our ex-
periments, we explored how WAZE reacts to machine-like
behavior, such as spawning all bots at the exact same
time or driving at the same speed, along the same route,
all at once. We spent a significant amount of time plan-
ning our experiments to simulate benign human behav-
ior. We added a mechanism for gradual creation of the
driver botnets, with random time spacing between each
spawn. We also implemented our command and con-
trol interface such that each bot could receive a differ-
ent movement pattern, along with randomization. After
successfully implementing the attack, we proceeded to
verify the necessity of these mechanisms. We retried the
traffic jam scenario, while disabling each of these mech-
anisms, and learned that a congestion was reported re-
gardless. This means that WAZE makes no observable
effort to differentiate human from machine behavior. Ul-
timately, this may have been a wise design choice, as
applying such mechanisms is destined to fail against a
highly skilled attacker. However, in Section 4 we de-
scribe two techniques that can mitigate such attacks.
2.3 Reporting Obstacles
Reporting persistent spurious obstacles The WAZE ap-
plication allows notifying nearby users of the presence
of obstacles on the road. Fig. 4 depicts the WAZE ob-
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Figure 4: WAZE obstacle reporting menu
stacle reporting interface. Reporting obstacles can be
done by any user, whether registered or not. The report-
ing process consists of a few clicks, and users are also
able to add a note or take a picture of the reported obsta-
cles. Once the report is complete, the obstacle immedi-
ately appears on the map of all nearby users, and stays
there for roughly 20 minutes. The duration can be ex-
tended, however, if reported as credible by other users.
Thus, fake sustainable reports can be easily produced by
a small group of bot drivers, one reporting an obstacle
with a designated note and the rest confirming the report.
We note that reporting a “Traffic Jam” obstacle does not
effectively create a traffic jam as in Fig. 2, or affect rout-
ing. Instead, a notification is shown on the map, left to
the discretion of the user.
Indirectly influencing traffic Although obstacle reports
do not influence routing (WAZE will not prefer a non-
obstructed road over an obstructed one), they have a
strong mental effect on human users. A user observing
multiple obstacles along a certain route, some containing
notes supposedly written by other users, may prefer tak-
ing a different route, or drive much slower through the
obstructed route. This could have an indirect effect on
traffic congestion and can be performed with a minimal
amount of resources.
Report system DDos We also considered attacks where
the report mechanism is rendered useless. This can
be performed by blasting the application with a huge
amount of spurious reports, in the form of a DDos attack.
Fig. 5 shows the effect of reporting multiple police units
and hazards over a small region. WAZE limits the number
of reports one user can produce in a short time frame, but
this limitation can be easily overcome by closing the ap-
plication and logging as a different user (reports remain
after the reporting user closed the application).
Invalidating benign reports Another similar attack can
be performed by invalidating benign user reports. When-
ever a WAZE user approaches an obstacle, they are given
the option to update the report as outdated. An attack
where the WAZE map is constantly combed for reports
and those are, in turn, invalidated by a bot driver, will in-
capacitate the report system and in fact give the attacker
full control of said system.
Figure 5: Fake reports of police units on the WAZE map
We note that the WAZE report system also allows di-
rectly influencing map layout, by reporting road closures
and map issues. However, we refrained from explor-
ing such scenarios as the risk of damaging benign WAZE
users was too great. Should this attack be made possible,
financial and safety implications are dire, where users
may completely avoid a closed road or be sent along a
non-existing path.
2.4 Tracking Users
Figure 6: WAZE live map
Statistically tracking users via the live map Fig. 6 shows
the WAZE “live map”, which functions as the main view
of the application. The live map features details of fel-
low WAZE users, over all locations, randomly appearing
in and out of the map. Further, one can receive detailed
information on a fellow user by clicking on their icon,
as seen in Fig. 6 (blurred for privacy reasons). It is also
possible to chat with or message the selected user, which
adds social network-like features to WAZE. Revealed user
information includes username, points and ranking, se-
niority and speed. This information may be leveraged
towards compromising user privacy. An attacker aiming
to track a certain username, could use this data to their
advantage. We did not fully explore this attack, however
our experiments suggest that (i) live maps differ from one
user to another, i.e. each user receives a list of differ-
ent usernames (ii) all users appear on some user’s live
map, at some point. These findings can be used to per-
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form a statistical attack, where live maps will be con-
stantly scanned, searching for a target username. Since
each client views a different set of users, with a suffi-
cient amount of clients, the whereabouts of a targeted
user could be ascertained. Gathered locations could be
grouped together into a partial route to be used for track-
ing unsuspecting users. We observed that user locations
on the live map are precise up to a time frame of 5 min-
utes. i.e. if a user appears on the live map at a certain
location, they were at that location within the past 5 min-
utes. User speed however, was observed to be inaccurate.
3 Experiment System Description
In this section we will shortly describe the experiment
parameters and tools developed to carry out attacks.
3.1 Emulating WAZE Clients
For the experiment purposes, we required a non-costly,
easily deployed system that will allow us to create and
control a large amount of WAZE clients. This suggested
a software emulation solution and after some research
we arrived at using Android Developer Tools software
emulator. This solution complied with our requirements
as it allowed us to run multiple instances over our Linux
servers. We used the Android Developer Tools version
22.3.0 with Android API 17 and ran the WAZE Android
client version 3.5.1.4.
3.2 Command and Control Interface
To allow for rapid development, we developed our sys-
tem in Python. We controlled the android clients through
the Android Debug Bridge (adb), a versatile command
line tool that allows communicating with an emulator in-
stance. After starting each emulator instance, WAZE was
installed on it through a series of ADB commands, sim-
ulating text and touch input. In order to successfully au-
tomate controlling the WAZE client on the emulator in-
stance, we used the WAZE application activity log, as it
was updated with every completed operation (we assume
for debugging). We suggest removing said logging from
future versions of WAZE.
3.3 GPS Data
In order to emulate driving along a route, we constructed
a small Android application which generates mock GPS
locations adhering to driving on the target route, accord-
ing to a given movement pattern. Our application, appro-
priately named TrafficJam, receives a start point, end
point and direction and then proceeds to generate mock
GPS locations along that route. WAZE considers these
mock GPS locations to be valid and moves the client ac-
cordingly on the map. The application also receives a
movement pattern, composed of an average speed, dura-
tion of movement and standstill intervals, and generates
the mock GPS locations accordingly, emulating moving
along the desired route, at the given speed, for the given
time duration, while standing still at certain intervals.
Fig. 7 contains pseudo-code of the congestion creation
script, implementing the attack described in Section 2.2.
CreateTrafficJam(num bots , route , reputed users ) {
emulators = StartEmulators(num bots) ;
InstallAndStartApp(emulators ,”Waze”) ;
InstallAndStartApp(emulators ,”TrafficJam”) ;
LoginWaze(emulators , reputed users ) ;
stops=”none” ;
TrafficJam(emulators , route ,70kph ,20min , stops ) ;
stops=”stop for 10s every 10s” ;
TrafficJam(emulators , route ,8kph ,20min , stops ) ;
TrafficJam(emulators , route ,2kph ,20min , stops ) ;
}
Figure 7: Congestion creation script pseudo-code
3.4 Experiment Location
As our experiments affect real WAZE users, we avoided
using major roads and highways. We ran our experi-
ments on Technion campus in the city of Haifa, Israel.
We chose this region as it is small enough and relatively
closed off to have a minor affect on the general user
population. However, the campus road system is large
enough to allow several navigation options. More im-
portantly, since the campus is frequented by a large and
technology-friendly crowd, we had ample amount of le-
gitimate WAZE users to establish our results as credible.
4 Mitigating Attacks
In this section, we will discuss several means for miti-
gation attacks, while comparing them by parameters of
simplicity, user experience, security and cost.
4.1 Verifying Drivers via Carrier Data
Relying on carrier data in social networks and mobile
applications An established trend for verifying users of
mobile applications and social networks is the use of mo-
bile carrier data. Facebook [5], Google, [2] and many
prominent mobile applications such as WhatsApp [6]
and Viber [7], encourage and even require their users
to verify their account using a legitimate mobile phone
number. While users of traditional social networks like
Facebook and Google+ may not always have a mobile
number, for WAZE this is not the case, as it was designed
to be run on a mobile device.
Linking users to a mobile carrier identity Retrieving
the user’s phone number upon registration and validat-
ing it would make the attacks of Section 2.1 consider-
ably more complex and costly. WAZE could still allow
for non-verified use of the application, but should give
much smaller weight to these type of users. Note that
this incurs a one time carrier cost per user.
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Verifying user location via carrier Mitigating attacks in
Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 requires validating the actual
location of the reporting entity. This can be done by ver-
ifying user reported GPS locations with the location of
the cellular antenna carrying it. To lower costs and net
traffic, this validation can occur periodically, at random
times selected by the application. This solution can also
be used to mitigate user tracking (Section 2.4), by dis-
closing fellow user information only to verified drivers.
Note that all attacks described in Section 2 would still be
possible, but would require purchasing a large amount of
mobile carrier equipment (SIM cards and equipment for
operating them), that would then need to be located in the
vicinity of the target area (to be considered as verified).
Ultimately, we consider using carrier data to be the
most secure method (as it relies on external verified
data), fairly simple to implement, and user friendly. The
disadvantage is the possible incurred cost by the carrier.
4.2 Verifying Drivers via Behavioral Analysis
Distinguishing human and robot behavior in Sybil at-
tacks has been the subject of much study [15, 14, 17, 16].
However, in the context of verifying driver behavior, the
subject has remained fairly unstudied. We briefly dis-
cuss several means for mitigating attacks based on user
behavior analysis.
Relying on existing validation mechanisms Like many
other mobile application, WAZE offers the option to login
via Facebook account. This can be further extended to-
wards using Google and Apple accounts, or simply ask-
ing users to solve a CAPTCHA. Granting better stand-
ing to validated users could help mitigate attacks in Sec-
tion 2, but is dependant on the validity of the underlying
mechanisms [10, 13].
Network traffic analysis Our attack consisted of numer-
ous client reports originating from a small number of
static IP addresses. A simple network analysis could
have thwarted these reports and treated them as un-
reliable. This approach could be further extended so
that reports originating from IP addresses affiliated with
3G carriers [11] receive better standing. Although this
method is somewhat related to carrier data, we did not
include it in Sec. 4.1, as it could be performed relatively
unbeknownst to the carrier. A skilled attacker could sub-
vert this defence mechanism by using multiple 3G net-
work access, incurring extra attack costs.
Analyzing user creation, movement and report patterns
In Sec. 2.2 we discussed possible mechanisms of disguis-
ing bot behavior, such as gradual creation of botnets and
different movement patterns for each bot. These could
be mitigated by performing a more in-depth analysis of
driver behavior and comparison with benign user behav-
ior. Unfortunately, these break against a skilled oppo-
nent, successfully mimicking human drivers. The same
technique could be applied to obstacle reports, prevent-
ing spurious reports and invalidation of benign reports.
The main advantage of this approach is that it could
be performed entirely in-house, without involving third
party components which incur extra costs and net traf-
fic. User experience is affected by registration validation.
However, as mentioned, analysing user behavior is fairly
complicated and can requires constant maintenance and
upgrade, in order to stay ahead of attackers.
5 Conclusion
We showed that a Sybil attack on a location based ser-
vice is possible, and could affect large communities of
users, causing financial damage and compromising se-
curity and privacy. Our attack requires a low amount of
resources, and can be performed by many attackers. We
offer ways for mitigating the attack, balancing simplicity,
effectiveness and cost.
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